19671

UNITED STATES AS THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT UNDER
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT: THE PROBLEM OF
MULTIPLE LITIGATION AND A CALL
FOR STATUTORY REFORM
The United States Government is similar in some respects to a
nationwide corporation, performing administrative and distributive
functions in every state.' Occasionally, these governmental functions
are conducted negligently, creating potential claims against the United
States for contribution or indemnity 2 While the defendant to a state
court tort action will seldom be required to litigate liability and damages more than once when it claims contribution or indemnity from a
national corporation, the defendant who asserts such a claim against the
United States will be forced to litigate these issues twice unless it can
remove the action and implead the United States in the federal court.
The devices of impleader and "vouching in" are often useful in
minimizing double litigation in multi-party tort actions. Impleader
permits the joinder of the alleged indemnitor or joint tortfeasor as a
third-party defendant.3 "Vouching in" involves notifying the third
party of the action and inviting him to participate in the defense against
plaintiff's claim. Failure to participate will bind the third party in a
subsequent action as to the existence and extent of the liability established in the original action.4 While these devices are usually available
to the state court defendant asserting a claim against a nationwide corporation, they are not available when the third-party claim is asserted
against the United States.
1 Some operations such as the postal service are of necessity conducted in every
state. Political considerations also insure that other functions are distributed among

the states.
2

Actions against the United States for contribution or indemnity may be maintained under the Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946), as amended
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). See, e.g., United States v. Yellow Cab
Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951); Hanldnson v. Pennsylvania R.R., 280 F.2d 249 (3d Cir.
1960); Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. United States, 220 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1955);
United States v. Acord, 209 F.2d 709 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 975 (1954).
3
FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) has served as a model for many state impleader provisions:
"At any time after commencement of the action a defendant, as a third-party plaintiff,
may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the

action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him."
See, e.g., Apiz. R. Civ. P. 14(a); CoLo. R. Civ. P. 14(a); DEL. SUPER. CT. (CIV.)
R. 14(a); Ky. R. Civ. P. 14.01; Mo. STAT. ANN. § 507.080 (1966); NEV. R. Civ. P.
14(a); UTAH R. Civ. P. 14(a).
4
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 107, comment c (1942), sets out a rationale for
this procedure:
Where a person is under a duty to another to indemnify the other against
losses suffered as the result of . . . a tort, the indemnitor is entitled to a
trial to determine whether his liability has come into existence. He may or may
not be under a duty to the indemnitee to defend the action against the latter
(439)
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Impleader is proper only where the third party is within the
forum state's jurisdiction. In personam jurisdiction can be asserted
over a nonresident corporation on the basis of corporate contacts with
the state. 5 Since a tort action cannot be maintained against the United
States in a state court, an attempt to implead the United States at the
state level will fail for want of jurisdiction.'
Similarly, an attempt to "vouch in" the United States will also
fail. In City of Pittsburgh v. United States,7 the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit held that the United States could not be bound by
a state court judgment in a subsequent action for indemnity brought
under the Federal Tort Claims Act.' Pittsburgh was found liable in
a state court to a pedestrian, injured as the result of a defective sidewalk
in front of a building owned and occupied by the United States.
Pennsylvania law places primary responsibility for defective sidewalks
and if he is under no such duty he commits no breach by failing to defend. In
this event he is entitled, in the subsequent action against him for indemnity,
to show that the indemnitee was not subject to liability and hence not entitled
to indemnity. On the other hand, since by hypothesis his is the ultimate
liability, it is fair that the indemnitee should be able to throw off the burden
of the trial and that the indemnitor should respond to a request for assistance
by the indemnitee. If he fails to give this assistance at the time when it is
of the greatest importance, it is fair that he should abide by the result of
the trial . .

.

. [I]f he permits the matter to result in an action his should be

the responsibility to see that it does not result in an improper judgment.
The majority of reported cases deal with the process of "vouching in" in the context
of indemnity. However, there is authority for the use of this process where the
potential claim is for contribution. See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 109 (1942);
JAMES, CiviL PRocEDuRE 590 (1965).

See also the discussion of the doctrine in

Keitz v. National Paving & Contracting Co., 214 Md. 479, 136 A.2d 229 (1957).
5 In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), the Court
stated that
due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment
in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
The states have availed themselves of this power in order to provide a convenient
forum for claims of their citizens. An example of the state response to the "minimum
contacts" test is ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Supp. 1965) :
(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who . . .
does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits . . . to the

jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising
from the doing of any said acts:

(b) The commission of a tortious act within this State.
(c) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in
this State.
6"The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to
be sued . . . and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's
jurisdiction to entertain the suit." United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586
(1941). See Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382 (1939). Congress has required
that actions under the Tort Claims Act be brought only in the district courts: "[T]he
district courts . . .shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against
the United States for money damages . . .for injury or loss of property, or personal
injury or death . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964).
7 359 F.2d 564 (3d Cir. 1966).
8 Ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946), as amended (codified in scattered sections of

28 U.S.C.).
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on the abutting landowner, while attaching secondary liability to the
municipality. If the city alone is sued, both impleader and "vouching
in" are available to prevent multiple litigation if the city wishes to
0
seek indemnity from the landowner."
Pittsburgh attempted to employ both devices. Impleader was
denied by the state court which properly recognized that it did not
have jurisdiction over the United States." Pittsburgh also gave notice
to the United States and unsuccessfully attempted to remove the
action.' After satisfying the state court judgment, Pittsburgh sought
indemnity from the United States under the Tort Claims Act.
Pittsburgh's motion for summary judgment was granted, the district
court declaring that "the action in this Court does not involve retrial
of the suit against the City or a rehashing of the negligence case tried
in the State court." 13 The court of appeals reversed, insisting that a
state court judgment on a jury verdict could not be conclusive in a
subsequent action for indemnity against the United States.
The appellate court based its decision on the statutory requirements that the federal district courts have "exclusive jurisdiction of
civil actions on . . . [tort] claims against the United States" ' and
that "any action against the United States under . . . [the Federal
Tort Claims Act] shall be tried by the court without a jury." '" The
9 E.g., City of Philadelphia v. Bergdoll, 252 Pa. 545, 97 AtI. 736 (1916) ; Ferrang
v. Michaels, 206 Pa. Super. 43, 211 A.2d 96 (1965); Wright v. City of Scranton,
128 Pa. Super. 185, 194 Ati. 10 (1937) ; Fisher v. City of Philadelphia, 112 Pa. Super.
226, 170 At. 875 (1934) ; Fowler v. Jersey Shore Borough, 17 Pa. Super. 366 (1901).
10 See the discussion of "vouching in" in Fowler v. Jersey Shore Borough, mspra
note 9, at 372. See also Vinnacombe v. City of Philadelphia, 297 Pa. 564, 568-69, 147
At. 826, 827-28 (1929) ; PA. R. CIV. P. 2252.
11359 F.2d at 565.
12 Id. at 567. Pittsburgh's petition for removal was denied by the district court
because Pittsburgh did not meet the requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (1964). Brief
for Appellant, p. 3 n.2, City of Pittsburgh v. United States, 359 F.2d 564 (3d Cir.
1966). The action against Pittsburgh was initiated on December 8, 1960. Id. at 2.
In March, 1961, Pittsburgh attempted to implead the United States and subsequently
attempted to remove the action. Section 1446(b) then required that "the petition for
removal of a civil action . . . shall be filed within twenty days after . . . the service
of summons upon the defendant . . . ." It is evident that Pittsburgh's petition was
not timely. The petition would, however, have been denied in any event since the
action against Pittsburgh was not removable under the requirements of §§ 1441(a)
and 1441(b), the primary removal provisions:
(a) . . . [Any civil action brought in a State court of which the district
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the
defendant ....
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties, or laws
of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or
residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if
none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a
citizen of the state in which such action is brought.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a), (b) (1964). The action against Pittsburgh was founded on
state law and did not involve diversity of citizenship.
1a City of Pittsburgh v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 809, 811 (W.D. Pa. 1965),
reVd, 359 F.2d 564 (3d Cir. 1966).
'428 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964).
15 28 U.S.C. §2402 (1964).
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United States could not have been a party to the state court action.
Thus a decision giving effect to the "vouching in" process would deny
the United States any opportunity to litigate the basis of its liability. 6
Furthermore, the court believed that the use of "vouching in" would
effectively substitute the judgment of a state court jury for that of a
federal judge in contravention of the statutory requirement that tort
liability of the United States be determined only by a federal judge.
The summary judgment procedure followed in the district court was
17
deemed only a formal compliance with this requirement.
Although the result is correct, the decision presents a problem of
multiple litigation by requiring Pittsburgh to relitigate all issues essential to its cause of action." This result is inconsistent with a philosophy
of modern systems of procedure which aims at avoiding the expense,
16The device of "vouching in" assumes that the third party has notice of the
tort action and an opportunity to decide whether to participate in the defense. It can
reasonably be assumed that if the third party does not participate, he is willing to
abide by the results of the original action. Cf. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 107, comment c (1942). Since only the federal district courts have jurisdiction over Tort
Claims Act actions, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964), an attempt by a United States Attorney to make the United States a party to a state court tort action would be futile, for
he could not vest the state court with jurisdiction in this manner. "Where jurisdiction
has not been conferred by Congress, no officer of the United States has power to
give to any court jurisdiction of a suit against the United States." Minnesota v.
United States, 305 U.S. 382, 388-89 (1939). Thus the United States does not have
a choice when given notice of a pending state court action and its nonparticipation
cannot then be accorded the significance granted to the nonparticipation of a private
litigant. Application of the doctrine of "vouching in" against the United States in
the circumstances presented by Pittsburghwould therefore be contrary to one premise
of that doctrine itself-that the third party has had an opportunity to litigate. An
assumption that by its nonparticipation in the state court the United States indicated
its willingness to abide by the determinations of that action is improper.
17 359 F.2d at 569. The summary judgment in the district court was improper
in any event since, even if the Pennsylvania rules regarding "vouching in" could
properly be applied to this case, the United States would have been entitled to litigate
one important issue-whether the accident was caused by conduct of the city or its
agents for which the city was exclusively responsible. If so, the city's liability would
be primary rather than secondary. See City of Philadelphia v. Bergdoll, 252 Pa. 545,
548, 97 AtI. 736, 737 (1916) ; Wright v. City of Scranton, 128 Pa. Super. 185, 194
Atl. 10 (1937).
IS The City must prove all these facts not admitted by the United States
which are essential to its cause of action, and the United States will have open
to it all of the defenses it may offer against the claim, regardless of whether
these issues were adjudicated by the state court judgment as between the
pedestrian and the City.
359 F.2d at 569.
The problem of multiple litigation presented by Pittslrgh may be mitigated
somewhat by recent amendments to the Tort Claims Act providing for increased
availability of pre-trial settlement of claims. At present, the Attorney General is
authorized to settle claims under § 1346(b) after the commencement of the action
only with the approval of the court. 28 U.S.C. § 2677 (1964). The federal agencies
may only settle claims under $2500. 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1964). Amendments to § 2672
will permit increased agency settlement of claims without limiting the amount, provided that written approval of the Attorney General be obtained for claims over
$25,000. 80 Stat. 306 (1966). Thus a defendant in the situation posed by this Comment may be able to secure a settlement of its claim without being required to institute suit.
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inconvenience and possibility of inconsistent verdicts resulting from
multiple litigation. 9
In practice, multiple litigation will probably be necessary in only
a limited number of cases; if the action is removable, the United States
can be impleaded in the federal court.2" The problem is most likely
to occur where the plaintiff has an opportunity to sue either the
United States or another financially responsible party. Where the
alternate defendant appears to be capable of satisfying a judgment,
plaintiff's counsel may forego an action against the United States for
two reasons. In the state court action against the private defendant,
the plaintiff will normally have the right to elect a jury trial. A jury
trial is not available in an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act."'
Secondly, the Federal Tort Claims Act limits attorney's fees to 20%
of the judgment,22 which may be significantly lower than the average
contingent fee in other tort actions.2' Plaintiff's attorney may therefore choose to bring his client's action against the alternate defendant
in a state court where he may choose a jury and reasonably believe
that he is maximizing his client's recovery and his own fee.
The state court defendant with a potential action against the
United States may have an opportunity to avoid double litigation of
some issues through the use of stipulations. For example, in the
action for indemnity or contribution, the United States may be willing
to stipulate that the original plaintiff was not contributorily negligent.24
19 See, e.g., CLARK, CODE PLADING 408, 413 (2d ed. 1947) ; JAMES, CIvIL PRocEDuRE 505 (1965) ; Clark, The Influence of Federal Procedural Reform, 13 LAw &

CONTEM . PROB. 144, 155-56 (1948); Holtzoff, A Judge Looks at the Rules After
Fifteen Years of Use, 15 F.R.D. 155, 161-62 (1953).
20 See, e.g., United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951) ; Hankinson
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 280 F.2d 249 (3d Cir. 1960); Newsum v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
79 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
2128 U.S.C. § 2402 (1964).
2228 U.S.C. § 2678 (1964). The 20% limitation will be inapplicable to claims
arising after January 18, 1967. Congress has amended § 2678 to allow fees up to 25%
of a judgment against the United States under § 1346(b) or an amount received in
settlement after the commencement of the action. At present § 2678 provides that
the court will set the attorney's fee in each case. The amendment eliminates this
provision, allowing the fee to be set by agreement between the attorney and his
client. The amendment also raises the ceiling on attorney's fees applicable to administrative settlement of claims prior to trial from 10% to 20%. 80 Stat. 306 (1966).
Section 2678 continues to provide that an attorney who charges more than the
statutory limit is subject to a fine of $2,000 and imprisonment for one year.
23 It has been estimated that the average contingent fee in Massachusetts is 30%.
Hughes, The Contingent Fee Contract in Massachusetts,43 B.U.L. REV. 1, 13 (1963).
The suggested fee schedule of the Michigan State Bar Association sets a figure of
3311% for cases actually tried and 40% for those appealed. Mich. S.B.J., Aug. 1966,
p. 46. See also Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, 160 N.E.2d 43, 188 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1959).
24 See Hankinson v. Pennsylvania R.R., 280 F.2d 249 (3d Cir. 1960). A railroad
sought indemnity from the United States for the amount paid to an employee in settlement of a claim arising under the Federal Employers Liability Act where the employee
vas injured because of a defect in a government mailbag. In the action for indemnity
the railroad and the government stipulated that the settlement figure was reasonable
and that the railroad would thus not be required to litigate the issue of extent of
damages.
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The willingness of the United States to enter into such stipulations
may depend upon its confidence in the quality of the defense offered in
the original action. 5
Limited participation by the United States in the state court
action-ranging from informal consultation with defense counsel to
participation as amicus curiae 2 6-- might serve to eliminate doubts as
to the quality of the original defense. Although Pittsburgh clearly
demands independent adjudication of the liability of the United States
in a federal court, it would not appear to preclude participation in
the state court aimed only at limiting issues by consent.
While flexible and informal, this solution is unsatisfactory because
it is based on voluntary action by the United States designed to give
practical assistance to one who will subsequently be an adverse party.
The United States cannot be compelled to act out of self-interest-it
need not fear that its nonparticipation in the state court will bind it in
the later action for indemnity or contribution. Indeed, if this approach
were followed, the United States would be subject to some of the same
problems of expenditure of time and resources arising from double
litigation that are imposed on the defendant by Pittsburgh.
A better solution to the problem is removal of the original action
by impleading a government officer or employee who, under the particular fact situation, might be considered responsible for the activity
Since claims
giving rise to the claim against the United States.
against government officers and certain employees are removable, the
25 The government's attitude in this regard is well illustrated by its position in
Pittsburgh: "[T]he United States by being compelled to remain aloof was forced to
risk a judgment adverse to its interest resulting perhaps from inadequate or incompetent defense by one who has a plainly secondary interest." Brief for Appellant,
p. 9 n.6, City of Pittsburgh v. United States, 359 F.Zd 564 (3d Cir. 1966).
Familiarity with the nature of the initial tort action by a representative of the
Justice Department or of the federal agency involved in the particular tort situation
might also have the effect of increasing the likelihood of settlement before the commencement of an action against the United States. This will be increasingly true
after January 18, 1967, when amendments to the Tort Claims Act, improving the
possibility of pre-trial administrative determination of claims against the United
States, become effective. See note 18 supra.
26An amicus curiae is generally not considered a party to the action and will
not be bound thereby. See, e.g., City of Winter Haven v. Gillespie, 84 F.2d 285,
287 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub norn. Hartridge-Cannon Co. v. Gillespie, 299 U.S. 606
(1936); Village of North Atlanta v. Cook, 219 Ga. 316, 321, 133 S.E.2d 585, 589
(1963). The United States has been granted leave to appear as amicus in state courts
where essential interests of the government were at stake. See, e.g., City of New
Rochelle v. Republic of Ghana, 44 Misc. 2d 773, 255 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Sup. Ct 1964)
(foreign relations) ; Dawe v. Silberman, 185 Misc. 335, 56 N.Y.S.2d 902 (Munic. Ct
N.Y. 1944) (wartime economic controls). While the United States cannot become a
party to the action in the state court, see note 16 supra, there is no prohibition against
participation short of actually becoming a party, which will not bind the United States
thereafter.
27The impleaded government officer or employee must be one who would be
liable as an individual in each particular situation. In some cases the identification
of such an individual may be difficult Of course, many cases are likely to arise from
automobile accidents and the identification of the government driver should not be
difficult
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addition of such a claim to the state court action may result in the
removal of the entire action.
Actions against officers of the United States are removable under
28 U.S.C. § 1442, which provides:
(a) A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced
in a State court against any of the following persons may
be removed by them to the district court of the United States
for the district and division embracing the place wherein it
is pending:
(1) Any officer of the United States or agency
thereof, or person acting under him, for any act under
color of such office ....

2

Tort actions against government employees arising out of motor
vehicle accidents ' are removable under 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) ° The
government driver is required to notify his superiors of the pending
action 3 and upon certification by the Attorney General that the defendant was acting within "the scope of his employment," the case is
removed and the United States is substituted as the defendant." A
claim which meets the requirements of either section 1442 or section
2679(d) is removable despite the absence of diversity of citizenship or
a federal question.3
Since neither section 1442 nor section 2679 deals expressly with
third-party claims,3 the basic interpretive problem is whether a thirdparty claim, which would be removable under either section if brought
as a separate action, will trigger the removal of the entire action when
.

2828 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1) (1964). See, e.g., Coxsey v. Hallaby, 334 F.2d 286
(10th Cir. 1964) (administrator of FAA); Blitz v. Boog, 328 F.2d 596 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 855 (1964) (doctor attached to VA hospital) ; Allman v. Hanley,
302 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1962) (doctors attached to Air Force); Poss v. Lieberman,
299 F.2d 358 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 944 (1962) (HEW claims agent);
Bradford v. Harding, 284 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1960) (forty-six members of a federal
grand jury, a United States Marshal, two United States Attorneys, a federal judge,
a United States Postal Inspector and a New York City detective) ; Sarner v. Mason,
228 F.2d 176 (Od Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 924 (1956) (Federal Housing
Commissioner).
2980 Stat. 306 (1966), 28 U.S.C. §2679(b) (Supp. -).
0
See Lipinski v. Bartko, 237 F. Supp. 688 (W.D. Pa. 1965); Van Dor v.
Huffman, 221 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Ill. 1963); Adams v. Jackel, 220 F. Supp. 764
(E.D.N.Y. 1963); Gustafson v. Peck, 216 F. Supp. 370 (N.D. Iowa 1963).
3128 U.S.C. §2679(c) (1964).
8228 U.S.C. §2679(d) (1964).
33 [T]he federal government has a special interest in . . . [claims against
government officers] which justifies the granting of removal jurisdiction to
the federal courts in such cases. Congress has not in § 1442, as in § 1441,
required that the case be one over which the court have original jurisdiction
in order for the defendant to obtain removal.
Poss v. Lieberman, 299 F.2d 358, 359 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 944 (1962).
Neither § 1442 nor § 2679(d) requires a jurisdictional amount for removal.
84 The language of each section is broad enough to encompass third-party claims.
Section 142 provides for the removal of a "civil action"; §2679(d) speaks of .
"civil action or proceeding."
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it is joined by impleader to an otherwise nonremovable claim. Two
methods of interpretation are possible. The first is to read sections
1442 and 2679(d) in conjunction with 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c), which
provides for removal where there is joinder of removable and nonremovable claims. The second is to read sections 1442 and 2679(d)
independently of any other removal provisions and to interpret them in
the light of their language and purposes.
If these sections are to be read with section 1441(c), there is
little likelihood that the entire action can be removed on the basis of
the third-party claim against the government officer or employee
because of restrictive judicial interpretations of the language of section
1441 (c). Section 1441 (c) provides:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of
action, which would be removable if sued upon alone, is
joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or
causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the
district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters not otherwise within its
original jurisdiction. 5
The third-party claim, removable under either section 1442 or
section 2679(d), will satisfy the statutory requirement of a claim
"which would be removable if sued upon alone." Two problems are
then presented: (1) Does the language "is joined" in section 1441 (c)
contemplate only a joinder of claims by the plaintiff? (2) Is the
third-party claim for indemnity or contribution a "separate and independent claim or cause of action"?
Section 1441(c) has been interpreted to encompass only the
joinder of claims by the plaintiff, an interpretation based on a finding
that section 1441 (c) was designed to limit removal. 8 Applied to a
situation where a third-party claim against a government officer or
85 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (c)

(1964).

38 This interpretation seems to have had its inception with the publication of
MOORE, JUDICIAL CODE-COMMENTARY (1949). Professor Moore stated:

[S]ince there is no warrant for removal of an action except insofar as some
statute gives it, since the removal statute may properly be construed strictly
and against jurisdiction, and since it authorizes removal only in the case where
there has been a joinder of two or more causes of action and this joinder may
properly be confined to a joinder of claims by the plaintiff, we do not believe
that any claim introduced into the action by counterclaim, cross-claim, thirdparty claim, intervention, or garnishment should afford the basis for removal.
Id. at 252. Courts have generally followed this pronouncement. See, e.g., White v.
Baltic Conveyor Co., 209 F. Supp. 716 (D.N.J. 1962); Burlingham, Underwood,
Barron, Wright & White v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 208 F. Supp. 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1962);
Shaver v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 171 F. Supp. 754 (W.D. Ark. 1959) ; Sequoyah
Feed & Supply Co. v. Robinson, 101 F. Supp. 680 (W.D. Ark. 1951); cf. Shamrock
Oil & Gas Co. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941). Contra, Rafferty v. Frock, 135 "F.
Supp. 292 (D. Md. 1955) ; Industrial Lithographic Co. v. Mendelsohn, 119 F. Supp.
284 (D.N.J. 1954); President & Directors of Manhattan Corp. v. Monogram Associates, 81 F. Supp. 739 (E.D.N.Y. 1949).
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employee is joined with a nonremovable claim, this doctrine would
prohibit the removal of any part of the action. The statutory language
"separate and independent claim or cause of action" presents a second
problem. It has been interpreted to require almost complete independence of the two claims before section 1441(c) removal may be
invoked. In American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn,87 the Supreme Court
interpreted the phrase to conform to the evident congressional intent
to limit removal. The Court declared:
The effectiveness of the restrictive policy of Congress
against removal depends upon the meaning ascribed to
separate and independent cause of action38
[W]here there is a single wrong to plaintiff, for which
relief is sought, arising from an interlocked series of transactions, there is no separate and independent claim or cause
of action under § 1441(c)."
The addition of the word "independent" gives emphasis to
congressional intention to require more complete disassociation between the federally cognizable proceedings and those
cognizable only in state courts before allowing removal4
While a tort action and a third-party claim for contribution or
indemnity joined with it need not factually arise out of an "interlocked
series of transactions," it is clear that the two claims are closely
associated legally. The third-party cause of action is dependent upon
a determination of liability in the initial tort action. This dependence,
combined with the Supreme Court's apparent emphasis of the word
"independent" and the remand provision of section 1441 (c), leads to
the conclusion that a third-party claim cannot be considered a "separate and independent claim or cause of action." 41 The district court
37 341 U.S. 6 (1951).
88
Id. at 12. The Court found authority for the proposition that Congress intended
to "abridge" the right of removal by amending § 1441(c) in a statement in the
Reviser's Notes to that section that the amendment "will somewhat decrease the
volume of Federal litigation." Id. at 10. This same statement is included in the
House Report explaining the changes to be made in Title 28. H.R. REP'. No. 308,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. A133 (1947). However weak this bit of legislative history is
to support the conclusion that Congress intended to restrict the right of removal, this
idea, in combination with the doctrine that removal statutes are to be strictly construed,0 has taken root in the judicial interpretation of § 1441(c). See note 36 supra.
Id. at 14.
40 Id. at 12.
41

Courts which have faced the problem of § 1441(c) removal based on a removable third-party claim have generally decided that the case is not removable because
a third-party defendant cannot remove under this section. See note 36 supra and
accompanying text. However a few courts have gone beyond this issue and have
chosen to decide whether a third-party claim can be "separate and independent." See
Rager v. Crampes, 223 F. Supp. 346 (W.D. Ky. 1963); Manternach v. Jones County
Farm Serv. Co., 156 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Iowa 1957); Marshall v. NAVCO, Inc.,
152 F. Supp. 50 (S.D. Tex. 1957); Shaver v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 171
F. Supp. 754 (W.D. Ark. 1959) (dictum--case decided on the joinder issue). See
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is empowered by section 1441 (c) to remand all matters not within
One of the prerequisites for section
original federal jurisdiction.4
1441 (c) removal is the independence of the claims. Presumably each
of these independent claims should be capable of surviving separation by
the remand of the nonfederal claim. The survival of such a separation
is impossible in an impleader situation because the third-party claim
is dependent on the tort action. Impleader accelerates the accrual of
the third-party cause of action. Remand of the original tort action
would leave the third-party claim hanging meaninglessly in the federal
court. For this reason it is difficult to conceive of a third-party claim
independent" confor contribution or indemnity as "separate and
4
sistently with the structure of section 1441 (c). 1
Since under section 1441 (c) the entire action must be removable
if any part of it is to be removable, the result of reading sections 1442
and 2679(d) in conjunction with section 1441(c) is to prevent the
removal of any part of the action by the third-party defendant. This
result is at variance with the obvious congressional intent in enacting
sections 1442 and 2679(d).
Because a government officer or employee can secure removal
of an action against him under section 1441 if the case meets the requirements of that section, it is evident that in enacting sections 1442
and 2679(d) Congress sought to grant a broader right of removal
unencumbered by the requirements of section 1441. The removal
provision of section 2679(d) was enacted to implement the general
purpose of section 2679-to make an action against the United States
the exclusive remedy for a plaintiff injured by a government motor
vehicle. Congress chose to accomplish this purpose by permitting the
removal of actions against government drivers and the substitution of
the United States as a party in the district court." Since such an
also Westwood Dev. Co. v. Higley, 266 F.2d 555, 558 (5th Cir. 1959), where a thirdparty claim was described for removal purposes as "no action at all. It was an action
over, a warning action, a stand by and defend notice. . . . In these circumstances,
'no separate and independent claim or cause of action' was presented."
42 "[T]he district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may
remand all matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (c)
(1964).
43 See cases cited in note 41 supra. This analysis is not always explicit in the
cases. The courts have decided either that the third-party claim is not a "claim or
cause of action" at all or that the third-party claim and the primary action arose out
of an "interlocked series of transactions." This second analysis may be valid where
the action is for contribution but need not be valid where the claim is for indemnity.
If the interlocking required is a factual connection, many indemnity actions, such as
those found in products liability cases, would not be considered interlocked.
providing for the removal of claims against government drivers, Congress
4In
sought to protect the drivers from having to satisfy judgments out of their own
resources. Another alternative would have been for Congress to provide for the
indemnification of the drivers for judgments rendered against them in the state courts.
This idea was rejected on the ground that it would subject the United States to the
payment of a judgment determined by a state court jury rather than by a federal
judge. See H.R. RE. No. 297, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1961).
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action against the United States falls under the Tort Claims Act,
removal to the district court is consistent with the grant of "exclusive"
jurisdiction to those courts by section 1346(b).
Unlike section 2679(d), section 1442 is not directed toward the
solution of a specific problem arising out of a recurring fact pattern.
Rather, section 1442 is aimed at a more general evil-the possibility
that the performance of the functions of the federal government will be
hampered or disrupted by lawsuits brought against federal officials in
the state courts.'
Furthermore, an unrestricted right of removal
secures for officers of the federal government the protection of the
federal courts which may be more sympathetic than the state courts
to the doctrines of governmental privilege and immunity for federal
48
officials.
In circumstances where a third-party claim against a government
officer is joined with an otherwise nonremovable tort claim, the purposes of sections 2679(d) and 1442 would be frustrated if the removability of the entire action were to be determined by the requirements of section 1441 (c). The more satisfactory approach is to read
sections 1442 and 2679(d) entirely apart from section 1441(c)."
This does violence to neither the language nor the structure of the
removal statutes. The reference in section 1441 (c) to a "claim removable if sued upon alone" can be read to apply only to claims
removable under the terms of sections 1441(a) and (b). Interpreted
in this manner, sections 1442 and 2679(d) will permit the removal
of an entire action to be triggered by the joinder of a third-party
claim against a government officer or employee. This would permit
the state court defendant facing the possibility of multiple litigation to
45 See Colorado v. Symes, 286 U.S. 510 (1932); Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S.
257 (1879); Yeung v. Hawaii, 132 F.2d 374 (9th Cir. 1942); Jones v. Elliott, 94
F. Supp. 567 (E.D. Va. 1950); Application of Shumpka, 268 Fed. 686 (N.D.N.Y.
1920). With the exception of Jones v. Elliott, these cases deal with predecessors of

§ 1442.

46 The theory underlying the doctrines of official immunity and privilege bears
an analogous relationship to the theory underlying the decision to permit removal of
claims against federal officers. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959).
47 Since subsection (c) is a part of section 1441, we believe that it applies
only when the separate and independent claim is removable under the general
article, section 1441 (a) and (b), i.e., on the basis of diversity or federal question. Consequently, section 1441(c) should not be applied to actions removable under, e.g., section 1442 (suits against federal officers).
Moore & VanDercreek, Multi-party, Multi-Claim Removal Problems: The Separate
and Independent Claim Under Section 1441(c), 46 IowA L. REv. 489, 512 (1961);

14 Sw. L.J. 535, 538 (1960). Courts apparently have accepted the view that the
requirements of the general removal statute need not be read into cases involving
§ 1442. The general requirement under § 1441 is that all defendants must join in the
petition for removal. This rule has been held inapplicable to § 1442. E.g., Bradford
v. Harding, 284 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1960). Likewise, the rule applicable to § 1441
that the facts demonstrating the right to remove must appear on the face of the
plaintiff's complaint has been held not to apply to removal under § 1442. Poss v.
Lieberman, 299 F2d 358 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 944 (1962).

Not all courts

have taken this position. Some have looked to the requirements of § 1441(c) for
guidance when faced with multi-claim removal under § 1442. See Westwood Dev.
Co. v. Higley, 266 F2d 555 (5th Cir. 1959).
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implead a government official and thus secure removal of the action
and ultimately joinder of the United States. 48
Joinder of an official or employee represents a rather circuitous
solution to the problem. A more direct and effective solution is an
amendment to the Tort Claims Act specifically designed to permit
removal of a tort action on the basis of an anticipated claim against
the United States arising out of that action. Such an amendment
might be drafted as follows: 4'
A defendant to a civil action or proceeding in a state
court who claims that the United States is or may be liable
to him under section 1346(b) for all or part of the plaintiff's
claim against him shall notify the United States Attorney
for the district embracing the place where the state court
action is brought. Such notice shall consist of copies of the
pleadings filed in the state court and a short and plain statement of the claim to be asserted against the United States.
A copy of such notice shall be filed with the district court
for the district embracing the place where the state court
action is brought and shall be considered a petition for removal and joinder of the United States as a third-party defendant. The United States may oppose this motion on the
grounds that it fails to state a claim against the United States
under section 1346(b). If at any time before trial, it appears
that no claim is stated against the United States, the action
shall be remanded.
This proposed amendment would permit the defendant to remove
the action and implead the United States, enabling him to litigate his
claim against the government according to the terms dictated by
48
Although § 1441 (c) permits the removal of an action where two relatively
independent claims are joined, removal of an entire action under § 1442 might properly
be limited to those cases where the two claims share so many characteristics that
judicial economy is promoted by removal to the federal court so that the relevant
litigation may be completed in one trial.
A recent amendment to the Tort Claims Act provides that no action may be
instituted against the United States until the claim has been presented to the appropriate federal agency for settlement and denied in writing by that agency. 80 Stat.
306 (1966). The removal device discussed here would result in the impleader of the
United States upon removal and would thus present no opportunity for the defendant
to present his claim to the appropriate agency prior to the commencement of the action
against the United States. The amendment provides for such a situation by excepting
from its provision claims against the United States asserted under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure by third-party complaint. Ibid.
41 Certain other federal statutes have been designed at least in part to promote
judicial economy. For example, the Federal Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1964),
grants federal jurisdiction to interpleader actions-a development which has the effect
of decreasing multiple litigation since where two claimants are residents of different
states, it may be impossible to interplead them successfully in the state court. See
Chafee, The Federal Interpleader Act of 1936, 45 YALE L.J. 963 (1936). Another
statute which has the effect of reducing multiple litigation is 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1964),
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Congress-in the federal district courts before judges sitting without
juries.50
Although this will solve the defendant's problem of multiple litigation, this solution may be objectionable to the plaintiff. Having
originally chosen the forum, plaintiff may contend that removal deprives him of a convenient or friendly place for trial.

Removal may

result in trial in a different city-perhaps in a metropolitan center
some distance from plaintiff's home or the place where the tort occurred.
The proposed statute minimizes but does not eliminate this problem by

making the proper district court depend upon plaintiff's initial choice
of forum-the action would be removable only to the district court

for the district embracing the place where the action is pending. 1
The plaintiff may also fear that the joinder of his claim with a
claim under the Tort Claims Act will deprive him of a trial by jury.

The Tort Claims Act prohibition against jury trials will not, however,
apply to plaintiff's claim against the defendant. It merely applies to
the defendant's third-party claim against the United States. The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide flexibility in handling related
actions.

If necessary, one action may be tried to a judge and the

dealing with the jurisdiction of the federal courts over cases involving patents, copyrights, trademarks and unfair competition:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, copyrights and
trade-marks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the
states in patent and copyright cases.
(b) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
asserting a claim of unfair competition when joined with a substantial
and related claim under the copyright, patent or trade-mark laws.
The Reviser's Note to this section, 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1964), indicates that subsection
(b) was enacted to avoid piecemeal litigation. This section is especially analogous
to the problem treated in this Comment since, as in actions under the Tort Claims
Act, patent and copyright cases are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the district
courts so that a claim for unfair competition cannot be joined with a claim arising
under the federal copyright laws in a state court.
Even more important for the purposes of this Comment is the congressional
intention to amend the Tort Claims Act so as to "ease court congestion and avoid
unnecessary litigation" by providing for increased possibility of settlement of claims
against the United States. H.R. REP. No. 1532, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966) ; 80
Stat. 306 (1966). Congress was concerned with the necessity for instituting suit
where the claim against the United States was for more than $2500 even though the
agency involved would have been willing to settle the claim. "The filing of the suit
and the consequent expense to the Government in preparing the case would appear
to be unnecessarily involved when the case is a proper one for early settlement." H.R.
REP. No. 1532, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1966).
In view of this congressional interest in some of the practical aspects of Tort
Claims Act litigation, it is not unrealistic to hope for some statutory remedy to the
problem of multiple litigation discussed here.
50 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964) ; 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1964).
51Venue under the Tort Claims Act is proper in the district embracing the place
where the negligent act occurred as well as where the plaintiff resides. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1402(2) (b) (1964). The proposed statute departs from this formula to minimize
possible inconvenience to the plaintiff.
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other simultaneously tried to a jury.5 Because of this flexibility, the
no-jury trial provision of the Tort Claims Act need present no barrier
to the joinder of the United States as a third-party defendant to a
tort action.
This flexibility of procedure will not eliminate one problem
raised by multiple litigation. Merely bringing the action into the
federal court will not automatically preclude the possibility of inconsistent verdicts. Where the split trial procedure is used, plaintiff's
action against the defendant being tried to the jury with the thirdparty action against the United States being tried to the judge,
it is theoretically possible that inconsistent verdicts on the issue
of defendant's liability will result. The judge will send the question
of defendant's liability to the jury where in his view reasonable men
might differ as to the result. This decision does not require that the
judge, as the trier of fact in the third-party action, find the United
States liable over to the defendant. The judge can consistently permit
the jury to find the defendant liable although he independently determines that for the purposes of the third-party action, the defendant is
not liable to the plaintiff. Even if the question of liability is determined consistently, the judge and the jury may still disagree as to the
amount of damages.
An amendment providing for removal presents the most satisfactory solution to the problem of double litigation where a claim for
contribution or indemnity against the United States arises out of an
62

The federal courts, in adopting a flexible approach, have permitted parallel

trials to proceed before the presiding judge and a jury, and have employed the

aid of special interrogatories where confusion might otherwise result, and have
worked out solutions where other difficulties have arisen. They have been
able to do this because both the original action and the claim against the United
States were heard in a federal court which could preserve both the limitations
of the Federal Tort Claims Act and the right to jury trial in the private dispute by allocating one aspect of the case to a jury and the other to the district
judge.

City of Pittsburgh v. United States, 359 F.2d 564, 568 (3d Cir. 1966). See FE. R.
Crv. P. 38, 39, 42(b) ; United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951) ; D.C.
Transit Sys., Inc. v. Slingland, 266 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 819
(1959) ; Schetter v. Housing Authority, 132 F. Supp. 149 (W.D. Pa. 1955) (advisory

jury); United States v. Schlitz, 9 F.R.D. 259 (E.D. Va. 1949) ; Englehardt v. United
States, 69 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1947).
53 See Englehardt v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1947). Plaintiff
brought an action against the United States and a private defendant as joint tortfeasors.
The private defendant moved to dismiss the action against him on the ground that
in an action against the United States under the Tort Claims Act, the nonjury trial
provision precludes the joinder of another defendant who would be entitled to a jury
trial. The court dismissed this argument with the observation that the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure provide sufficient flexibility to permit concurrent or, if necessary,
separate trials. Id. at 455.
54 See D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Slingland, 266 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 819 (1959), where plaintiff joined the Transit Company and the United
States as defendants. The jury found that the Transit Company was liable to the
plaintiff for $25,000. The judge reduced this amount by remittitur to $15,000 but

found, as the trier of fact in the action against the United States, that the government
was liable for only $10,000.
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otherwise nonremovable state court action. One trial, conducted in
the federal court, has the advantage of resolving all claims arising out
of one incident without duplication of effort while permitting the
United States to litigate the question of its liability in accordance with
the conditions imposed by Congress. Although only a small number
of cases are likely to be affected by such legislation, the judicial economy
which will be promoted in these cases will certainly justify this new
approach.

